Recent Study: The Capabilities of Artificial Intelligence Do Not Imply It Has Consciousness

SadaNews - As artificial intelligence systems evolve, an old question has resurfaced: Can machines possess consciousness? The debate is no longer confined to philosophy or science fiction; it has become part of a broader scientific and ethical discussion that also encompasses animals, embryos, and brain organoids cultured in laboratories.

However, a new analytical study published in the journal "Neuron" does not attempt to directly answer whether artificial intelligence is conscious. Instead, it raises a more fundamental question: Do current sciences have the precise tools necessary to measure consciousness itself? The study was prepared by a team led by Haokuan Lau, director of the Neuroimaging Research Center at the Institute of Basic Science, in collaboration with researchers from the University of Montreal and New York University.

The researchers contend that a significant portion of current consciousness research may not clearly distinguish between subjective experience and information processing. This distinction is important because a system, whether a human brain or a computer model, may receive information, analyze it, and respond to it without necessarily having an internal conscious experience.

In comments reported by the study, Lau noted that many existing theories about consciousness appear to be supported by scientific experiments, but those results may reflect "general information processing" more than they do consciousness itself. Therefore, it remains difficult to assert that these theories actually explain consciousness.

This point complicates the discussion around artificial intelligence consciousness. If scientific tools are not yet capable of isolating consciousness from other cognitive processes in the brain, it becomes challenging to use them confidently to judge non-human entities, such as artificial intelligence systems or life forms unable to express verbally.

The researchers criticize some common experimental models in neuroscience, such as visual masking, binocular rivalry, and perceptual threshold tests. These experiments are used to study when something becomes visible or consciously perceived, and when it remains outside of direct awareness.

However, the problem, according to the study, is that these tests do not solely change consciousness. They may also affect the brain's overall ability to process information, which could lead researchers, unintentionally, to conflate the absence of conscious experience with a deficiency or change in cognitive processing itself.

In simpler terms, a researcher might believe that their experiment measures what a person actually experiences, while it only partially measures the brain's ability to receive, process, or respond to the signal. This mix-up becomes more sensitive when similar indicators are used to make judgments about the consciousness of entities or systems that cannot describe their experiences themselves.

Artificial Intelligence, Animals, and Organoids

The study warns that this methodological problem could lead to stronger claims than the evidence permits. In recent years, there has been increased discussion about animal consciousness, the potential consciousness of artificial intelligence, embryonic experiences, and brain organoids cultivated for research purposes.

The study does not claim that these entities are conscious or not; rather, it suggests that the evidence used in such discussions may be weaker than it appears if the indicators measure information processing rather than subjective experience. Thus, the researchers call for stricter scientific standards before using consciousness research findings in ethical or regulatory matters.

This call does not diminish the importance of the discussion but rather makes it more serious since the question of consciousness in animals or artificial intelligence is no longer merely an academic issue if it will impact animal welfare policies, the ethics of artificial intelligence development, or biomedical research related to embryos and neural tissues.

The researchers point out that psychology faced a similar problem in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During that time, strong, poorly founded claims about consciousness led to a widespread scientific backlash, which later contributed to the rise of behaviorism, a school that steered away from studying internal experience for decades and focused on observable behavior.

This historical example is important because it illustrates that exaggerated claims about consciousness could harm the field rather than serve it. If scientific conclusions appear to be greater than the available evidence, this could lead to a loss of confidence in consciousness studies or to its avoidance as a subject that cannot be accurately measured.

Therefore, the researchers do not call for closing the discussion but rather for protecting it from hasty conclusions. According to their analysis, what is needed is the development of methods that can isolate subjective experience more precisely, rather than relying solely on general indicators of perception or processing.

The study suggests that certain neurological cases may help scientists understand the divide between consciousness and information processing. Examples include "blindsight," where some patients can respond to visual stimuli without being consciously aware that they have seen them. Another case is hemispatial neglect, where the patient ignores one side of the visual or spatial field even though some sensory processing may be present.

These cases reveal that perception, behavior, and consciousness do not always move together. The brain may process certain information without it becoming a clear conscious experience. This opens the door to developing more accurate experiments that can distinguish whether a system is responding to information and whether it has a subjective experience of it.

For artificial intelligence, this point is crucial because the system may answer questions, describe feelings, talk about subjective experiences, and analyze complex information. However, these capabilities alone are not sufficient to prove the existence of consciousness, as they may result from advanced linguistic or computational processing.

This discussion becomes increasingly important because societal decisions may be influenced by what scientists say about consciousness. If it is asserted that an intelligent system is conscious, it may raise questions about its rights or how to interact with it. Conversely, if it is said that an animal or brain organoid has some form of experience, the boundaries of permissible research and experimentation could change.

Lau stated that questions of consciousness carry significant ethical and societal implications, adding that the scientific foundations supporting these claims must be "rigorous," especially if they are to affect discussions on issues such as animal welfare and the ethics of artificial intelligence.

In this sense, the study is not solely about artificial intelligence; it establishes a general standard for the discussion: Before we ask whether an entity is conscious, we must know whether our tools actually measure consciousness or measure something close to it that is not the same.

The study does not provide a definitive judgment on the consciousness of machines, animals, embryos, or brain organoids. It does not deny the possibility of researching these questions but warns against relying on potentially inadequate indicators, especially when scientific results turn into ethical positions or public policies.

What the study accurately states is that the science of consciousness requires greater conceptual and methodological clarity. While artificial intelligence may become more capable of simulating human language and behavior, measuring consciousness demands more than observing external performance; it requires tools that can differentiate between information processing and the existence of an internal subjective experience.