Artificial Intelligence and the Naming Strategy

Artificial intelligence is no longer a field that attracts official interest solely for political, economic, or scientific reasons. Interest in it has gone beyond these traditional spheres and reached deeper dimensions.

A sign of this is that US President Donald Trump has reportedly intervened by proposing that the concept itself be renamed, suggesting alternatives such as “Super Intelligence,” “Superior Intelligence,” or “Extreme Intelligence.”

His rationale is that a change in terminology would better reflect the “growing wealth” expected to emerge from this field. Coupled with his intention to appoint an “AI Czar,” he has even proposed putting the name change to a vote.

Some view this proposal as little more than linguistic indulgence. Others see it as evidence of an American drive to politicize the field on the one hand, and a determined effort to contain the catastrophic risks that may accompany its advancement on the other. Every scientific and technological revolution leaves behind its own fragments, earthquakes, and redrawn maps.

The resignation of Jacob Coxon on September 9 was one of the warning signs of this rising technological wave. He argued that his decision to leave an artificial intelligence company stemmed from his conviction that the field, in its current form and trajectory, could profoundly affect human existence within a decade or less.

Following his resignation, many experts appeared to agree with his concerns, asserting that far more remains hidden in this domain than humanity currently understands. As a result, discussions of the risks AI poses to humanity, whether in terms of health, economics, ethics, or even existence itself, have become widespread and compelling.

It is only natural that debates about its ethical repercussions now dominate academic and scientific discourse, given their potential impact on human interactions, family life, and the broader structure of worldly existence.

From a philosophical perspective, artificial intelligence has, in many ways, validated the earliest predictions and ethical concerns raised more than two centuries ago by prominent philosophers.

Their reflections on technology seem to find their fullest expression in this contemporary development. Yet AI has also introduced challenges that are more immediate and demand greater responsibility. Among those who addressed the issue was philosopher Edgar Morin, who wrote briefly about it before his death at the age of 104 on May 29.

He did not live long enough to place the subject under extended scientific scrutiny and strengthen the theoretical framework needed to confront this extraordinary technological breakthrough.

If Martin Heidegger, one of the twentieth century’s most influential philosophers, devoted extensive writings and lectures to technology and its relationship with science when modern technology was still in its infancy, that alone reflects an early awareness of the looming concern.

Heidegger expanded on the possibility that technology might one day displace human beings and famously argued that “science does not think.” Even Friedrich Nietzsche’s sparse observations on technology played a modest role in shaping Heidegger’s analytical path.

In the same context, on June 13, 2023, Hasan Mansur al-Hajj published an article in this newspaper titled “Technology Within the Limits of Reason and Ethics.” It was a rich essay surveying several major theoretical perspectives. He concluded that:

“If we return to the question of technology as a rational issue, we find ourselves asking about the rational limits of the technological phenomenon. Is it limited in time and space, or is it unlimited? Rationally speaking, it may be either. That depends on its function and on the extent to which it violates, first, the capacity of reason, and second, the human moral law. In this matter, too, we find ourselves facing a new contradiction related to technology.”

Al-Haj then refers to the theory of Janicaud, who argued:

“The contradiction inherent in rational capability in the age of technological power may be expressed as follows: everything that is technically feasible ought to be realized, regardless of whether its realization is considered ethically good or morally condemnable. The opposing thesis states that nothing that is technically feasible ought to be realized if its realization threatens or eliminates humanity’s moral capacity.”

After discussing the arguments of Janicaud and Hans Jonas, Al-Hajj concludes that:

“Janicaud shares Jonas’s concern for the future of humanity, provided that this future does not come at the expense of the present. This means that present and future are linked through reason’s capacity, open to future possibilities. But will these possibilities remain captive to the authority of the alliance between technology and science, or will they become a sphere of partnership in which that monopoly is broken? Accordingly, this openness to possibility will spread and find expression in three sacred domains: ethics, politics, and poetry.”

The upshot is that the ongoing debate at every level about the most dynamic and problematic concept in human history, artificial intelligence, is both necessary and inevitable.

All the warnings that magnify its catastrophic potential have their own dramatic appeal and respond to humanity’s enduring fascination with the question: What comes next? Yet it is more likely that we are witnessing the emergence of new worlds shaped by this concept, worlds that will fragment the single, unified world humanity has known throughout the ages.